I would rather be a respondent state before a domestic court in the EU than before an international investment tribunal by Damjanovic, Ivana & de Sadeleer, Nicolas
 European Papers www.europeanpapers.eu ISSN 2499-8249 
Vol. 4, 2019, No 1, pp. 19-60  doi: 10.15166/2499-8249/284 
 
Articles 
Special Section – The Achmea Case 
Between International Law and European Union Law 
edited by Ségolène Barbou des Places, Emanuele Cimiotta and Juan Santos Vara 
 
 
 
I Would Rather Be a Respondent State 
Before a Domestic Court in the EU 
than Before an International Investment 
Tribunal 
 
 
Ivana Damjanovic* and Nicolas de Sadeleer** 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS: I. Introduction. – II. Who trumps who? – II.1. Is EU law autonomous? – II.2. EU law and 
Member States’ BITs. – II.3. The peculiar case of the ECT. – III. Achmea or how international investment tribu-
nals do not understand EU law. – III.1. Why investment tribunals do not have jurisdiction in all intra-EU dis-
putes? – III.2. The Advocate General’s Opinion is not legally binding and preliminary ruling judgment only 
answers the questions asked. – III.3. Why is commercial arbitration different? – IV. Who fragments what? – 
IV.1. The peculiar case of the ECT again: fragmentation or integration? – IV.2. Why is intra-EU context differ-
ent to extra-EU? – V. Why autonomy matters? – V.1. It matters for EU relationship with international courts. – 
V.2. It matters for EU integration. – V.3. It matters for practical reasons of enforcement. – VI. Conclusion. 
 
ABSTRACT: In its landmark judgment in the case of Achmea (judgment of 6 March 2018, case C-
284/16 [GC]), the Court of Justice adjudicated that Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) ad-
versely affects the autonomy of EU law. Accordingly, ISDS clauses in international investment 
agreements that contravene Arts 267 and 344 TFEU and the principles of mutual trust and sincere 
cooperation enshrined in Arts. 19, para. 1, and 4, para. 3, TEU are inapplicable under EU law. How-
ever, the reasoning of the Court of Justice in Achmea did not convince international investment 
tribunals that they lack jurisdiction in intra-EU investment disputes. This opposition calls for clarifi-
cation of the different principles underpinning the EU legal order and international investment law. 
This Article presents a debate between these two legal orders, which unfolds around three sepa-
rate, albeit related issues: the status and applicability of the EU and the Member States’ interna-
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tional agreements within the EU legal order; the manner in which the Achmea judgment must be 
interpreted and its application in the international investment law context; and the meaning and 
relevance of the concept of the autonomy of EU law as the key issue in defining the relationship 
between EU law and international investment law. 
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I. Introduction 
This Article is a debate between the EU legal order and international investment law. It 
is a debate between two legal systems, which share similar foundations but have none-
theless, different objectives and methods of reasoning. These differences have led to 
mutual tensions, with their full consequences yet to be revealed. In its essence, this de-
bate is a discussion about the validity of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) 
clauses encapsulated in intra-EU bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and the Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT) under EU law. These international investment agreements were 
concluded between mostly Western EU Member States and the Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean States during the 1990s in order to protect Western States’ investors in the new-
ly open markets of the former Comecon. At that time they were extra-EU international 
investment agreements, concluded between EU Member States and third States. From 
2004, with the progressive accession of the Central and Eastern European States to the 
EU, they have become intra-EU BITs. There are still 181 of these agreements in force.1 
The debate between these two legal orders commenced soon after the main en-
largement, around the year 2006, when the European Commission noted “arbitration 
risks and discriminatory treatment of investors” stemming from intra-EU BITs, whose con-
tent has partly been “superseded by Community law upon accession”. The Commission 
thus invited the Member States to review the need for these agreements “in order to 
avoid legal uncertainties”.2 The debate has intensified since, reaching its climax in March 
2018 with the Achmea judgment delivered by the Grand Chamber of the CJEU, in which 
the Court ruled that the ISDS clause in the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT is incompatible with 
EU law.3 The consequences of the Achmea decision remain controversial and the subject 
of ever opposing views about its relevance for investment treaty arbitration in the EU. 
 
1 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Investment Policy Hub, invest-
mentpolicyhub.unctad.org. Only two BITs were concluded between “old” Member States: 1961 Germany – 
Greece BIT and 1980 Germany – Portugal BIT. 
2 Economic and Financial Committee (EFC), 2007 Annual EFC Report to the Commission and the 
Council on the Movement of Capital and the Freedom of Payments of 23 November 2007, 
ECFIN/CEFCPE(2007)REP/55240, para. 14. 
3 Court of Justice, judgment of 6 March 2018, case C-284/16, Achmea [GC]. 
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In broader terms, this is a debate about the autonomy of EU legal order and its re-
lationship with international law in general, and investment law in particular. As pre-
sented in this Article, the debate will oppose two visions on who should have the au-
thority to adjudicate investment disputes between investors from a EU Member State 
and another EU Member State. The notion of autonomy is the central issue and at the 
same time the key misunderstanding of this debate. While EU law claims its autonomy, 
which cannot be adversely affected by international law, international investment law 
shows little interest in supporting such vision. Indeed, according to investment lawyers, 
EU law is embedded in a domestic or a regional context. Accordingly, this legal order is, 
in any case, subordinated to international law. 
In more general terms, lawyers have a propensity to claim the autonomy of their legal 
orders. As autonomy goes hand in hand with national sovereignty, it comes as no surprise 
that every sovereign State asserts the autonomy of its law. At this stage, however, the EU 
has no sovereignty. It is neither a federation nor a confederation, let alone an independ-
ent State. Yet, it claims the autonomy of its legal order with respect to both the legal order 
of its 28 Member States and international law, justifying it by the constitutional structure 
of the EU and the very nature of EU law, which stems from international law. The auton-
omy has been defined either as “a normative axiom”4 or as a “central constitutional prin-
ciple”.5 Moreover, EU law claims its primacy over domestic laws of its Member States. 
Such vision however, has not been immediately or unconditionally accepted by legal con-
stituencies of all Member States. Only recently, in Germany and France, the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) and the Conseil Constitutionnel respective-
ly, have been referring questions for preliminary rulings to the CJEU.6 This trend is further 
exacerbated in dualist legal regimes, shared by several Member States, such as the UK, 
Italy, and Ireland. More cynical observers would note that this reluctance in accepting the 
prevalence of EU law over domestic laws of Member States has even resulted in the ex-
treme scenario of Brexit. While most of the Member States have not been that extreme, in 
reality the authority of EU law over constitutional laws of Member States is tolerated ra-
ther than embraced by national constitutional courts. 
For pedagogical reasons, this debate espouses a fictional dimension.7 Two parties 
argue their case: on the one hand, an imaginary Professor of EU law, Mr Van Gend en 
Loos, convinced by the soundness of the CJEU case-law regarding the autonomy of the 
 
4 A. VON BOGDANDY, J. BAST, Principles of European Constitutional Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010, p. 39. 
5 E. PAASIVIRTA, European Union and Dispute Settlement: Managing Proliferation and Fragmentation, 
in M. CREMONA, A. THIES, R.A. WESSEL (eds), The European Union and International Dispute Settlement, Ox-
ford: Hart Publishing, 2017, p. 32. 
6 M. BLANQUET, Le dialogue entre les juges constitutionnels et la Cour de justice: enfin des mots, tou-
jours des maux?, in B. BERTRAND, F. PICOD, S. ROLAND (dir.), L’identité du droit de l’Union européenne. Mé-
langes en l’honneur de Claude Blumann, Brussels: Bruylant, 2015, p. 288 et seq. 
7 Any resemblance to real characters is unintentional and accidental. 
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EU legal order; on the other, an investment arbitrator, Ms Icsid, considering that EU law 
cannot ever trump international investment law. How will this debate proceed? Our 
protagonists will tackle three issues. Firstly, they will introduce the concept of EU au-
tonomy and, through its lenses, discuss the relationship between EU law and interna-
tional law. In this respect, the status and applicability of international agreements con-
cluded by the EU and the Member States within the EU legal order is examined (section 
II). Secondly, the debate will continue by focusing on the Achmea judgment, which is at 
the core of controversy between international investment lawyers and EU lawyers. In 
this regard, in section III the two protagonists disagree on the effects of the Achmea 
judgment on jurisdictional issues in intra-EU disputes. Their debate then moves towards 
the interpretation of the Achmea judgment by various investment tribunals and its im-
pact on international law, with particular focus on the ECT (section IV). As a third and 
final issue, the debate returns to the autonomy of the EU legal order, at this point ex-
plaining its relevance, by focusing on EU relationship with other international courts; 
European integration more generally; and the enforcement of intra-EU investment 
awards in more practical terms (section V). For each issue, Professor Van Gend en Loos 
will attempt to convince Ms Icsid why she should give up her jurisdiction in intra-EU in-
vestment disputes whilst she will, as a matter of course, defend her jurisdiction by 
questioning the relevance of EU law in investment arbitration. The aim of this fictional 
debate is not to let one protagonist win over the other, but to identify the bones of con-
tention between their two visions. 
II. Who trumps who? 
ii.1. Is EU law autonomous? 
Ms Icsid: The relationship between EU law and international investment law is complex 
and there is room for disagreements, as the debate on this issue has demonstrated so 
far. However, both the CJEU and investment tribunals agree that EU law is part of inter-
national law. For example, the Electrabel tribunal noted that “EU law is international law 
because it is rooted in international treaties”,8 and this has been undisputed by all sub-
sequent investment tribunals.9 Even the post-Achmea tribunals, such as the tribunal in 
Vattenfall II, found that EU law, to the extent of the founding Treaties, should not be ex-
 
8 ICSID, decision on jurisdiction, applicable law and liability of 30 November 2012, case no. 
ARB/07/19, Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, para. 4.120. 
9 See for example, ICSID, decision on jurisdiction of 6 June 2016, case no. ARB/13/30, RREEF Infra-
structure (G.P.) Limited and RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux S.à r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain 
(RREEF v. Spain), para. 73. To this effect, see the comment of the tribunal in ICSID, decision on the Ach-
mea issue of 31 August 2018, case no. ARB/12/12, Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germa-
ny (Vattenfall II), para. 146. 
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cluded from “the purview of international law” under Art. 38, para. 1, let. a), of the Stat-
ute of the International Court of Justice.10 In the same manner, the Court of Justice re-
calls that EU law is “characterised by the fact that it stems from an independent source 
of law, the Treaties”.11 
Therefore, if we accept that EU law is part of international law, its Court should not 
claim that it is an autonomous legal order, which prevails over international law. In effect, 
the international legal order is a horizontal one. Various international agreements are 
placed upon equal footing, whereby any conflicts between them must be resolved by the 
application of general international law treaty conflict rules, which are codified in the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). In case of inconsistency between an in-
ternational investment treaty and EU law, absent the possibility that such inconsistency 
can be reconciled through interpretation, “unqualified obligation” of any arbitral tribunal 
constituted under an international investment treaty would be to apply public interna-
tional law. This applies to all cases, even when it is to the detriment of EU law since “EU 
law does not and cannot ‘trump’ public international law”.12 In buttressing the autonomy 
of the EU legal order, as the CJEU did in Achmea, EU law indeed trumps international law. 
Professor Van Gend en Loos: The claim that EU law trumps international law is nugato-
ry. At the outset, the EU legal system is an “open system”13 subordinated to internation-
al law, be it jus cogens or jus erga omnes or jus dispositivum.14 Under Art. 3, para. 5, 
TEU, the EU is to contribute to the strict observance and the development of interna-
tional law. In accordance with Art. 21, para. 1, TEU, “the Union’s action on the interna-
tional scene” must be “guided” by “respect for the principles of the United Nations (UN) 
Charter and international law”. Consequently, when it adopts an act, the EU is bound to 
observe international law in its entirety, including customary international law, which is 
binding upon the institutions of the EU.15  
In addition, any international agreement to which the EU accedes is, by virtue of Art. 
216, para. 2, TFEU, binding on the institutions of the EU and its Member States.16 There-
 
10 Vattenfall II, cit., paras 145-150. 
11 Achmea [GC], cit., para. 33. Regarding the international foundation of the EU legal order, see A. 
PELLET, Les fondements juridiques du droit communautaire, in Collected Courses of the Academy of Euro-
pean Law, Leiden: Martinus Nijhff, 1997, p. 219. 
12 RREEF v. Spain, cit., para. 87. 
13 P.J.G. KAPTEYN, P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, Introduction to the Law of the European Communities, 
London: Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 278. 
14 S. ADAM, S. HAMMAMOUN, E. LANNON, J.V. LOUIS, N. NEUWAHL, E. WHITE, L’Union européenne comme ac-
teur international, Brussels: Èditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2015, p. 82. 
15 See, to this effect, Court of Justice: judgment of 24 November 1992, case C-286/90, Poulsen and 
Diva Navigation, paras 9 and 10; and judgment of 16 June 1998, case C-162/96, Racke, paras 45 and 46. 
16 In accordance with Art. 216, para. 2, TFEU, the treaties concluded have primacy over acts of second-
ary EU law. See, to that effect: Court of Justice, judgment of 3 June 2008, case C-308/06, Intertanko and Oth-
ers, para. 42 and case-law cited. Moreover, measures emanating from bodies which have been established 
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fore, when exercising its powers, the EU must observe international law. The CJEU is 
competent to disapply incompatible provisions of an international agreement conclud-
ed by the EU in case of their substantive inconsistency with EU law and international 
rules which are binding on the EU.17 Last but not least, the CJEU is under an obligation 
to “take due account” of the wording and purpose of international law, such as UN Se-
curity Council (Security Council) resolutions.18 
Mc Icsid: To my understanding, the EU legal order is only conditionally open towards 
international law. The CJEU as the supreme guardian of the EU legal order considers EU 
law as specific international law to which other international law instruments should 
conform, when necessary to achieve the objectives of the EU founding Treaties. In other 
words, international law is not deemed to be an autonomous source in the EU legal sys-
tem. Such approach to international law is always justified by the international charac-
ter of EU law itself as an autonomous legal order based on the founding Treaties, which 
cannot be trumped by an international agreement.19 In that connection, the CJEU has 
long ago emphasised the contrast between the EU founding Treaties and “ordinary in-
ternational treaties”.20 The opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Kadi mirrors that interpre-
tation: “In Van Gend en Loos, the CJEU considered that the Treaty had established a 
‘new legal order’, beholden to, but distinct from the existing legal order of public inter-
national law”.21 I do not see why the EU founding Treaties would be any different from 
other international treaties, and how could that be an argument to justify EU law’s 
prevalence over international law. 
Professor Van Gend en Loos: One has to differentiate between two issues. On the one 
hand, as a matter of principle, the EU legal order must be consistent with the general 
principles of international law.22 On the other hand, the agreements concluded by the 
EU have become part of the normative hierarchy of that legal order. In effect, in accord-
ance with the Court’s settled case-law, international agreements concluded by the EU 
 
by an international agreement concluded by the EU and a third State form part of the EU legal order. See 
Court of Justice: judgment of 20 September 1990, case C-192/89, Sevince, para. 10; judgment of 16 Decem-
ber 1992, case C-237/91, Kus; judgment of 28 February 2008, case C-293/06, Deutsche Shell, para. 17. 
17 Court of Justice, judgment of 27 February 2018, case C-266/16, Western Sahara Campaign UK, pa-
ras 45-48. Taking into account that the territory of Western Sahara does not form part of the territory of 
Morocco under international law, the CJEU reached the conclusion that the EU-Morocco Agreement was 
not applicable to the waters adjacent to the territory of Western Sahara. See D. SIMON, Applicabilité des 
accords entre l’Union européenne et le Royaume du Maroc ou territoires du Sahara occidental: Acte II, in 
Europe, 2018, p. 6 et seq. 
18 Court of Justice, judgment of 16 November 2011, case C-548 /09 P, Bank Melli, para. 106. 
19 Court of Justice, judgment of 3 September 2008, joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi, pa-
ras 281 and 316; Achmea [GC], cit., para. 33. 
20 Court of Justice, judgment of 15 July 1964, case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL. 
21 Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro delivered on 16 January 2008, case C-402/05 P, Kadi, para. 24. 
22 Arts 3, para. 5 and 21, para. 1, TEU. 
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pursuant to the provisions of the Treaties constitute, as far as the Union is concerned, 
acts of the institutions of the EU.23 Accordingly, one has to understand that the interna-
tional agreements concluded by the EU pursuant to the provisions of the Treaties are, 
from the date of their entry into force, an integral part of the EU legal order.24 It follows 
that the EU legal order is a monist system.25 
However, it would be wrong to conclude that, once the EU is bound by an interna-
tional treaty, the CJEU “must bow to that rule with complete acquiescence and apply it 
unconditionally”.26 Although the Court takes great care to respect the obligations that 
are incumbent on the EU by virtue of international law, it seeks, first and foremost, to 
preserve the constitutional framework created by the Treaty. In this connection, the in-
tegration of international agreement into the EU legal order may be subject to both an 
ex-ante (Art. 218, para. 11, TFEU) and an ex-post review (Arts 263 and 267 TFEU). When-
ever international agreements are inconsistent with either founding Treaties provisions 
or general principles of EU law, they are deemed to be invalid. 
With respect to the ex-post review, the CJEU has jurisdiction, in the context of both 
an action for annulment (Art. 263 TFEU) and in a request for a preliminary ruling (Art. 
267 TFEU), to assess whether an international agreement concluded by the EU is com-
patible with the founding Treaties and the constitutional principles stemming from 
them. In so doing, the Court is empowered to nullify the decision of the Council con-
cluding an international agreement whenever such agreement is incompatible with EU 
law.27 Therefore, the CJEU does not have the power to declare an international agree-
ment invalid, but can nullify the decision adopted under EU law concluding the agree-
 
23 Racke, cit., para. 41; and Court of Justice, judgment of 25 February 2010, case C-386/08, Brita, para. 39. 
24 Court of Justice, judgment of 30 April 1974, case 181/73, Haegeman, para. 5; judgment of 22 No-
vember 2017, case C-224/16, Aebtri, para. 50; opinion 1/91 of 14 December 1991, para. 37; judgment of 
10 January 2006, case C-344/04, IATA and ELFAA, para. 36; and judgment of 21 December 2011, case C-
366/10, ATAA, para. 73. 
25 S. VAN RAEPENBUSH, Droit institutionnel de l’Union européenne, Brussels: Larcier, 2011, p. 486; A. 
POTTEAU, Les dimensions constitutionnelles de l’autonomie de l’ordre juridique communautaire, in S. Ro-
drigues (dir.), L’Union européenne: Union de droit, Union des droits. Mélanges en l’honneur de Philippe 
Manin, Paris: Pédone, 2010, p. 190; A. Rosas, The European Court of Justice and Public International Law, 
in J. WOUTERS, P.A. NOLLKAEMPER, E. DE WET (eds), The Europeanisation of International Law as Law of the EU, 
The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2008, p. 71. Taking into consideration the process of domestic implemen-
tation of international law, Cannizzaro is of the opinion that the EU legal order must be described as 
“neo-monist”: see E. CANNIZZARO, The Neo-Monism of the European Legal Order, in E. CANNIZZARO (ed.), In-
ternational Law as Law of the EU, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2011, p. 35. 
26 Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, Kadi, cit., para. 24. 
27 The international agreements are concluded under Art. 218, para. 6, TEU by the Council of Ministers. 
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ment.28 Of course, the Court’s jurisdiction arises only “in the context of the internal and 
autonomous legal order of the Community”.29 
Ms Icsid: Would you not agree that the CJEU goes too far in reviewing the conformity of 
EU law with international law? The prime example is the Kadi case, in which the Court of 
Justice effectively assessed the validity of UN Security Council measures under EU law. 
The Court held that “an international agreement cannot affect the allocation of powers 
fixed by the Treaties or, consequently, the autonomy of the Community legal system”,30 
essentially claiming precedence of EU law over the Security Council decisions. Would 
you not think that the Court is endorsing the tradition of nationalism or “fortress Eu-
rope”, as some legal scholars noted while casting a critical eye over this judgment?31 
Furthermore, the CJEU looks at the EU as an almost perfect legal order, in which all 
EU acts endorse protection of human rights as a condition of their validity, and can be 
reviewed in “the framework of the complete system of legal remedies established by 
the Treaty”.32 It seems to me that EU law claims superiority over international law, be-
cause it is the rule of law order. At the same time, the CJEU sends an implicit message 
that international law does not comply with the rule of law, at least not to the same ex-
tent. The Court explains this in the following terms: “The Community is based on the 
rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid review 
of the conformity of their acts with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty, which 
established a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to enable 
the Court of Justice to review the legality of acts of the institutions”.33 
Professor Van Gend en Loos: The Kadi judgment has to be examined in its specific 
context. It has to be noted that, at the time when this judgment was delivered, restric-
tive measures adopted by the Security Council were not subject to any kind of review. 
These black list measures were fleshed out into the EU legal order, as a matter of effi-
ciency, by a specific EU secondary act – a regulation – which had to be consistent with 
the general principles of the EU legal order, including fundamental rights.34 The CJEU 
 
28 Court of Justice, judgment of 10 March 1998, case C-122/95, Germany v. Council of the European Un-
ion; judgment of 11 September 2003, case C-211/01, European Commission v. Council of the European Union. 
29 Kadi, cit., para. 317. 
30 Ibid., para. 282. 
31 See for example, C. TOMUSCHAT, The Kadi Case: What Relationship Is There Between the Universal 
Legal Order under the Auspices of the United Nations and the EU Legal Order, in Yearbook of European 
Law, 2009, p. 654. 
32 Kadi, cit., paras 284-285. 
33 Ibid., para. 281. 
34 Kadi case concerned the adoption of restrictive measures executing the UN sanctions against the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The adoption of national measures freezing the assets of the claimants in 
each Member State would have been ineffective given the free movement of capital within the internal 
market. Accordingly, the EU adopted a series of measures at the Community level to give effect to Mem-
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did not review the lawfulness of the Security Council measures but the lawfulness of 
an Union act that gives effect to these international law measure. The claimant had a 
remedy to challenge the EU secondary act while he was deprived of such a remedy 
under UN law. Hence, would you not agree that EU law offered a better protection to 
the claimant? That was what the Court had in mind when it asserted that “the Com-
munity is based on the rule of law”. 
Ms Icsid: I would agree that international law, although a rules-based order, in the ab-
sence of review mechanisms of measures adopted under these rules, is not perfectly 
implementing the rule of law. However, it is almost as the EU asserts its specific interna-
tional law nature, which is with its “complete system of legal remedies and procedures” 
also a higher rule of law, as an excuse when it wishes to justify its prevalence over in-
ternational law. In other words, EU law is “better” international law, to say-so. For this 
reason, it affirms its supremacy whenever international law is unable to achieve the EU 
law standards, as assessed by the EU itself. 
Professor Van Gen den Loos: The autonomy of the EU legal order has been buttressed 
in 2009 by the integration of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(EU Charter) into primary law in accordance with Art. 6, para. 1, TEU. This bill of rights 
clearly brings the EU legal order closer to a constitutional order. What is more, given 
that the EU acknowledges the protection of human rights as one of its key values, do-
mestic constitutional courts cannot anymore claim that EU law may trump their bill of 
rights.35 Kadi case was a reaction to the insufficient protection of fundamental rights at 
the UN level. Today, given that the UN review mechanism has been improved in the 
wake of this judgment, Kadi might have been ruled differently.36 
Ms Icsid: Nevertheless, in light of the Kadi judgment, I am still not convinced that the EU 
legal order is monist. The relationship between EU law and international law is, in prac-
tical terms at least, determined by the internal effects of international agreements in 
the EU legal order. This, arguably, renders EU law dualist.37 The reception of WTO law 
into the EU legal order is a case in point. According to settled CJEU case-law, WTO 
Agreements have direct effect under very narrow conditions. Although the EU and its 28 
Member States are parties to the WTO, it is nearly impossible for litigants to challenge 
 
ber States’ UN obligations, including an EU regulation. The claimant whose funds were frozen as a conse-
quence of this action, challenged the EU regulation before the CJEU as the violation of his fundamental 
rights to property and a fair hearing. 
35 German Federal Constitutional Court, judgment of 29 May 1974, BVerfGE 31, 271, Solange I - In-
ternationale Handelsgesellschaft von Einfuhr - und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel. 
36 See J. KOKOTT, C. SOBOTTA, The Kadi Case – Constitutional Core Values and International Law – Find-
ing the Balance, in European Journal of International Law, 2012, p. 1019 et seq. 
37 See F. MARTINES, Direct Effect of International Agreements of the European Union, in European 
Journal of International Law, 2014, p. 129. 
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EU secondary law for breaching WTO law. It is hypocritical to claim that EU law is subor-
dinated to international law and, at the same time, pick and choose when international 
law prevails over EU secondary law. In filtering the agreements that are deemed to be 
compatible with the EU legal order, the CJEU constantly sorts wheat from chaff.38 
Professor Van Gen den Loos: One has to bear in mind that the CJEU has been endorsing 
a rather restrictive interpretation of the primacy of WTO law over EU secondary law for 
the reasons of reciprocity. In effect, the acknowledgment of direct effect of WTO 
Agreements’ provisions would lead to a disequilibrium:39 on the one hand, American 
litigants could invoke directly before the General Court of the EU these international 
provisions; on the other, European litigants could not invoke the same provisions be-
fore US courts. 
Ms Icsid: Your argument with respect to WTO law indeed makes sense. It would not be 
politically opportune for the EU or its Member States to do otherwise. In many aspects 
WTO seems to be a political arrangement rather than a legal one. 
However, so far in this discussion you focused on international agreements con-
cluded by the EU. As you explained, the CJEU is empowered to nullify an EU decision 
concluding an agreement that hampers the general principles of EU law and to disapply 
incompatible provisions of an international agreement concluded by the EU in the case 
of their substantive inconsistency with EU law and international rules which are binding 
on the EU. After all, this is logical and any domestic court would do the same when re-
viewing the legality of acts made under domestic law. But how can EU law prevail over 
the agreements concluded between Member States and third non-EU States? 
Professor Van Gend en Loos: The fact that EU law prevails over the Member States’ na-
tional laws also implies that EU law prevails over international agreements to which 
Member States are parties. In effect, such agreements form the integral part of Member 
States’ national legal orders. Therefore, Member States cannot enter into international 
agreements which would contain commitments for Member States capable of jeopard-
ising the attainment of the objectives of the EU Treaties or affecting the EU rules.40 In 
becoming Member States of the EU, they transferred part of their sovereignty to the EU, 
although they are sometimes still reluctant to accept this. 
 
38 A. BERRADMDANE, Le droit international, un ordre juridique propre intégré au système juridique de 
l’Union, IN B. BERTRAND, F. PICOD, S. ROLAND (dir.), L’identité du droit de l'Union européenne. Mélanges en 
l’honneur de Claude Blumann, Brussels: Bruylant, 2015, p. 288 et seq. 
39 Court of Justice, judgment of 23 November 1999, case C-149/96, Portugal v. Council, para. 47; 
General Court, judgment of 20 November 2002, case T-79/01, Chiquita brands; Court of Justice, judgment 
of 1 May 2005, case C-377/02, Van Parys. 
40 Court of Justice, judgment of 31 March 1971, case 22/70, AETR, paras 17 and 22; opinion 2/91 of 19 
March 1993, paras 10-11. 
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ii.2. EU law and Member States’ BITs 
Ms Icsid: In the particular context of the Member States’ BITs, these agreements were 
concluded before the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, that is, before investment was included in 
the Common Commercial Policy. The EU had no powers with respect to their conclu-
sion. Accordingly, BITs are international agreements concluded between independent 
States under international law and are thus exclusively governed by international law. 
The EU did nothing to indicate to the Member States the incompatibility of their intra-
EU BITs with the EU obligations. Moreover, the EU encouraged prospective Member 
States to conclude BITs with the Member States before joining the EU.41 And the acces-
sion to the EU did not imply Member States’ duty to withdraw from their BITs. 
Professor Van Gend en Loos: It is true that the EU encouraged candidate States to con-
clude BITs with the Member States prior to their accession, with an aim to establish “a 
favourable climate for private investment, both domestic and foreign”.42 Therefore, it 
could be said that the EU’s aim was primarily focused on enhancing the overall invest-
ment climate in these countries, for their own benefit. However, when the Commission 
realised the incompatibility of intra-EU BITs with the functioning of the internal mar-
ket,43 in particular with respect to potential discrimination between investors from dif-
ferent Member States and the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU to interpret and apply 
EU law and State aid rules,44 it strongly advocated against the maintenance of these 
treaties.45 While Member States were fully aware of the Commission’s concerns, most 
 
41 See for example, Art. 64 of the Europe Agreement of 1 February 1993 establishing an association 
between the European Economic Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Romania, 
of the other part. 
42 Art. 85 of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement of 29 October 2001 between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Croatia, of the other part. 
43 See, for example, European Commission observations of 13 October 2011 in Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (PSA), case no. 2010-17, European American Investment Bank AG v. Slovakia. 
44 A notable example is the Micula case in which the arbitral tribunal ordered Romania to pay com-
pensation to a Swedish investor, disregarding the Commission’s position that such payment would in-
fringe EU State aid rules: see ICSID, award on jurisdiction of 22 October 2012, case no. ARB/05/20, Micula 
and Others v. Romania (2012 Micula v. Romania). More recently, the issue of State aid has been promi-
nent in a number of Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) cases against Spain, many of which are still pending. In a 
Decision of 10 November 2017, the Commission emphasised that any compensation to an investor on 
the basis of the modifications of the Spanish investment incentive scheme would qualify as State aid 
within the meaning of Art. 107 TFEU, which arbitral tribunals are not authorised to grant. Consequently, 
any payment of an award in these cases is subject to the standstill obligation: see Commission Decision 
C(2017) 7384 final of 10 November 2017 on State aid investigation. 
45 Economic and Financial Committee, 2008 Annual EFC Report to the Commission and the Council 
on the Movement of Capital and the Freedom of Payments of 17 December 2008, 17363/08, paras 16-18; 
2009 Annual EFC Report to the Commission and the Council on the Movement of Capital and the Free-
dom of Payments of 10 December 2009, 17446/09, paras 16-18. Similar concerns have been raised in all 
subsequent reports of the Economic and Financial Committee up to date. 
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of them did not share the same views and ignored the European Commission’s warn-
ings.46 In his opinion, AG Wathelet clearly highlighted the split between the Member 
States along political lines.47 A number of Member States considered intra-EU BITs 
compatible with EU law and “in certain circumstances, indispensable to secure legal cer-
tainty for intra-EU investors until an alternative mechanism has been found”.48 But it 
should not be forgotten that the Commission used its legal powers to compel the 
Member States to terminate their BITs.49 
Ms Icsid: With 181 intra-EU BITs still in force, the impression is that the Commission has 
not been very successful in using its “legal powers”. And while still in force, I do not see 
how these agreements could be inapplicable under international law. 
Professor Van Gend en Loos: Primacy of EU law is not only a matter of EU law but more 
importantly, it is a matter of international law. The drafters of the EU founding Treaties 
were well aware of the possibility of normative conflicts that could undermine the pro-
ject of EU integration. For this reason, they introduced a conflict rule in Art. 351 TFEU, 
which explains why investment tribunals should reach the conclusion that EU law pre-
vails over the BITs. This special conflict rule has been recognised by the international 
legal community as giving the EC Treaty “absolute precedence” over agreements that 
Member States have concluded between each other.50 The provision of Art. 351 TFEU 
 
46 Some Member States unilaterally denounced their BITs in an earlier stage, notably Ireland and Italy in 
2012 and 2013 respectively (however, in all truth Ireland ever concluded only one BIT – with the Czech Re-
public). Recently, the Czech Republic and Romania have terminated their intra-EU BITs, while Poland and 
Denmark suggested that they would follow. The Netherlands also announced that it would terminate all its 
12 intra-EU BITs: see the Letter of the Dutch Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation to the 
Chairperson of the Dutch House of Representatives of 26 April 2018, res.cloudinary.com. 
47 AG Wathelet in his preliminary observations identified the division of Member States into two 
groups: (1) those Member States that are countries of origin of investors and which rarely or never ap-
pear as respondent States, thus not supporting the argument of incompatibility (Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, Austria and Finland), and (2) those Member States that regularly appear as respondent 
States in intra-EU arbitrations, thus supporting the argument of incompatibility (the Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Greece, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia). See opinion of AG Wathelet 
delivered on 19 September 2017, case C-284/16, Achmea, paras 34-38. 
48 Economic and Financial Committee, Annual EFC Report for 2017 to the Commission and the Coun-
cil on the Movement of Capital and the Freedom of Payments of 29 May 2018, 9411/18, pp. 2, 11-12. 
49 In June 2015, the Commission initiated infringement proceedings against five Member States (Aus-
tria, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden) in accordance with Art. 258 TFEU and launched an 
administrative dialogue with the other 21 Member States who still had BITs in place (at that stage, all ex-
cept Ireland and Italy): see European Commission Press Release of 18 June 2015, Commission asks Mem-
ber States to terminate their intra-EU bilateral investment treaties. According to UNCTAD, 19 intra-EU 
BITs have been terminated because they expired, have been terminated by consent, or have been unilat-
erally denounced: see UNCTAD, Investment Policy Hub, cit. 
50 International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law. Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission of 13 April 2006, finalised by Maarti Koskenniemi, A/CN.4/L.682, para. 283. 
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requires the Member States, whenever their international agreements concluded be-
fore their accession to the EU are not compatible with the Treaties, to “take all appro-
priate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established”. Moreover, “Member States 
shall, where necessary, assist each other to this end and shall, where appropriate, 
adopt a common attitude”.51 It follows that whenever an agreement concluded by two 
Member States prior to their accession to the EU, such as the Netherlands – Slovakia 
BIT, is deemed to be incompatible with EU law, an obligation is placed on these States 
to remove the incompatibilities. The Member States are obliged not only to remove the 
pre-existing treaty obligations that clash with their EU obligations but also to eliminate 
any potential conflicts with future EU secondary law.52 Such conflict rule perfectly 
makes sense because it reduces, let alone eliminates the risk of discrepancies within 
the EU legal order.53 
Ms Icsid: However, Slovakia and the Netherlands did not remove these incompatibilities 
in their mutual BIT, whose ISDS clause was at the root of the controversy in Achmea. By 
the same token, other Member States made no attempts to renegotiate or modify their 
BITs prior to Achmea. In their respective investment treaties Member States have 
granted their consent to submit to arbitration any claim against them, with no exclusion 
of intra-EU claims. Therefore, their offer to arbitrate in intra-EU context expressed in 
these treaties was and still is valid under international law. How could developments in 
EU law in any way undermine prior consent to arbitration, which the States offered in 
their intra-EU investment treaties?54 Moreover, even if the BIT was implicitly and retro-
actively terminated at the time Slovakia joined the EU in 2004, it would still remain in 
force for a period of 15 years due to the sunset clause.55 
Professor Van Gend en Loos: As a matter of course, the accession to the EU did not en-
tail an explicit withdrawal from the Netherlands – Slovakia BIT. However, ISDS clauses in 
this and other intra-EU BITs must be regarded as superseded by subsequent interna-
 
51 Art. 351, para. 2, TFEU. 
52 Court of Justice, judgment of 3 March 2009, case C-205/06, European Commission v. Austria; 
judgment of 3 March 2009, case C-249/06, European Commission v. Sweden; judgment of 19 November 
2009, case C-118/07, European Commission v. Finland. 
53 Court of justice, judgment of 2 August 1993, case C-158/91, Levy. This is also clearly expressed in 
Art. 351, para. 3, TFEU: “In applying the agreements referred to in the first paragraph, Member States 
shall take into account the fact that the advantages accorded under the Treaties by each Member State 
form an integral part of the establishment of the Union and are thereby inseparably linked with the crea-
tion of common institutions, the conferring of powers upon them and the granting of the same ad-
vantages by all the other Member States”. 
54 To that effect, see ICSID, award of 15 June 2018, case no. ARB/13/31, Antin Infrastructure Services 
Luxembourg S.à. r.l. and Antin Energia Termosolar B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain, para. 224. Although this case 
involved the ECT, the argument mutatis mutandi can be applied to BITs. 
55 Art. 13 of 1991 Netherlands – Slovakia BIT. 
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tional treaties concluded between the Member States. In the case of Central and East-
ern European States, incompatible provisions of intra-EU BITs are firstly superseded by 
the Treaty on Accession, as from the date of accession of these Member States to the 
Union (1 May 2004).56 
Secondly, the Treaty of Lisbon to which all Member States are a party has amended 
and consolidated the text of the original EU Treaties. In accordance with Art. 30, para. 3, 
VCLT, when all the parties to the earlier treaty are also parties to the later treaty but the 
earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended, the earlier treaty applies only to the ex-
tent to which its provisions are compatible with the later treaty. 
After Achmea, the incompatibility between the ISDS clauses in intra-EU BITs and EU 
law is undisputable from an EU perspective and it should also be, for these reasons, 
clear from an international law perspective. 
Ms Icsid: However, it must be noted that Art. 30 VCLT applies to successive treaties re-
lating to the same subject matter. It is open to discussion whether BITs and EU Treaties 
relate to the same subject matter.57 Furthermore, how could the Achmea judgment, 
which is clearly placed in a national or regional context, undermine Member States’ ob-
ligations under the ICSID Convention,58 which is an instrument of public international 
law? In your view, is the ICSID Convention also incompatible with EU law? All Member 
States except Poland are parties to the ICSID Convention. It is undisputed that Member 
States did not expressly or impliedly terminate their participation in the ICSID Conven-
tion when they joined the EU.59 The Achmea judgment cannot be interpreted to support 
the argument that Member States are no longer bound by the ICSID Convention follow-
ing their accession to the EU.60 Consequently, consent to arbitration under Art. 25 of the 
ICSID Convention is valid and once given, could not be unilaterally or retroactively with-
 
56 See the Act of Accession (which is part of the Treaty of Accession) of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cy-
prus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic, Arts 2 and 6; the Act of 
Accession of Bulgaria and Romania, Arts 2 and 6; the Act of Accession of the Republic of Croatia, Arts 2 and 6. 
57 See Vattenfall II, cit., para. 212; Arbitral Tribunal of Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), partial 
award of 27 March 2007, case no. 088/2004, Eastern Sugar B.V. v. Czech Republic, para. 159; Permanent 
Court of Arbitration, award on jurisdiction, arbitrability and suspension of 26 October 2010, case no. 
2008-13, Achmea B.V. v. The Slovak Republic (formerly Eureko B.V. v. Slovak Republic), para. 258; award 
on jurisdiction of 22 October 2012, European American Investment Bank AG v. The Slovak Republic, para. 
184; Arbitral Tribunal of Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, award of 15 February 2018, case no. 
2015/063, Novenergia II - Energy and Environment (SCA) (Grand Duchy of Luxembourg), SICAR v. The 
Kingdom of Spain, para. 439; opinion of AG Wathelet, Achmea, cit., paras 56-57 and paras therein men-
tioned. 
58 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States (ICSID Convention) of 18 March 1965.  
59 ICSID, award of 9 October 2018, case no. ARB/13/35, UP (formerly Le Chèque Déjeuner) and C.D. 
Holding Internationale v. Hungary, paras 259-260. 
60 Ibid., para. 258. 
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drawn under Art. 72 of the ICSID Convention.61 In light of these arguments, I do not see 
why ICSID tribunals would not have jurisdiction to adjudicate intra-EU disputes. 
Professor Van Gend en Loos: All protections available to intra-EU investors under BITs are 
also available under EU law. The fact that the EU Treaties and the CJEU case-law have a 
wider scope ratione materiae than the BITs does not exclude the applicability of Art. 30 
VCLT.62 With respect to the ICSID Convention, one has to note that ICSID is not an autono-
mous system within international investment law. ICSID establishes procedure (forum and 
rules) for the settlement of disputes arising out of a particular international investment 
agreement. An intra-EU BIT could be considered lex specialis which supersedes the lex 
generalis enshrined in the ICSID provisions. In any case, without a particular BIT, which 
prescribes both substantive protections and the mechanism for their implementation 
through an ISDS clause, there could not be an investment claim and hence, the ICSID Con-
vention could not apply. Additionally, the EU is not a party to the ICSID Convention, which is 
thus not part of the EU legal order. Therefore, in case of a conflict between EU law and the 
ICSID Convention, national courts are called on to disapply the latter,63 in the same manner 
as they must disapply incompatible provisions of an intra-EU BIT or the ECT. Even if there 
was a valid offer to arbitrate, such offer is inapplicable in all cases because it is incompati-
ble with EU law. Therefore, Achmea sends a clear message to investors and their lawyers 
that they should not rely any more on ISDS clauses in intra-EU context. 
ii.3. The peculiar case of the ECT64 
Ms Icsid: When you refer to the “intra-EU context”, does this also include the inapplicability 
of the ISDS clause in intra-EU disputes under the ECT?65 Based on what you said so far, 
 
61 Ibid., paras 261-264. 
62 To this effect, see also discussion on the ECT, infra under section II.3. For explanation of invest-
ment protections under EU law, see Communication COM(2018) 547 final of 19 July 2018 from the Com-
mission to the European Parliament and the Council, Protection of intra-EU investment. 
63 See the discussion infra under section V.3. 
64 In 1994, both the EU (Decision 98/181/EC, ECSC, Euratom of the Council and Commission of 23 
September 1997 on the conclusion, by the European Communities, of the Energy Charter Treaty and the 
Energy Charter Protocol on energy efficiency and related environmental aspects) and its Member States 
concluded the ECT. The ECT has the same status in the EU legal order as a purely EU agreement (exclu-
sive competence) insofar as its provisions fall within the scope of EU competence. In addition, the EU is 
legally bound by the obligations on fair and equitable treatment and non-expropriation contained in the 
ECT. Accordingly, the compliance by EU secondary law with the ECT obligations may be subject to review 
before the EU courts. Needless to say, secondary law must be interpreted in accordance with the EU’s 
obligations stemming from the ECT (Court of Justice, judgment of 10 September 1996, case C-61/94, Eu-
ropean Commission v. Germany, para. 52). Since the ECT is a mixed agreement, it follows that it is imple-
mented and managed jointly by the EU and the Member States: see opinion of AG Jääskinen delivered on 
15 March 2011, case C-264/09, European Commission v. Slovakia, para. 60. So far, only one Member 
State, Italy, has withdrawn from the ECT. 
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there is a big difference between intra-EU BITs and the ECT. BITs’ compatibility with EU law 
became an issue following the accession of Central and Eastern European countries to the 
EU. However, the ECT was actually concluded between all EU Member States at that time 
and thus, effectively was an intra-EU agreement. Additionally, since the EU is a party to the 
ECT, the ECT also has binding effect on the EU and is a source of EU law. If the Commis-
sion now claims that the ECT is inconsistent with EU primary law, why has the EU joined 
this treaty in the first place? Moreover, why did the Commission play a crucial role in ne-
gotiating an agreement incompatible with EU law? As correctly noted by the Electrabel tri-
bunal, “as a matter of legal, political and economic history, the European Union was the 
determining actor in the creation of the ECT”.66 Consequently, “the ECT’s genesis gener-
ates a presumption that no contradiction exists between the ECT and EU law”,67 as they 
“share the same broad objective in combating anti-competitive conduct”.68 
Professor Van Gend en Loos: The ECT was concluded in 1994 when these issues were 
not yet controversial. At the time, it was a geopolitically important multilateral treaty, 
aimed at reducing investment risks for Western European investors in energy-related 
investment after the fall of communism in then unpredictable markets of Eastern Eu-
rope and the former Soviet Union. The EU had 12 Member States whose economic in-
terests were more or less coordinated: on the one hand, they wanted to ensure the ex-
pansion to new markets; on the other, it was important to guarantee sustainability of 
energy use in Europe.69 There has never been any intention to apply the ECT in disputes 
opposing EU investors and Member States. In other words, it was never intended that 
the ECT would be applied as an intra-EU multilateral treaty. The fact that the EU is a par-
ty to the ECT does not affect the applicability of the ECT in intra-EU disputes. As already 
explained, international agreements of the EU are applicable to the extent that they are 
compatible with EU primary law. 
Ms Icsid: However, one has to rely on the explicit provisions of the ECT when determining 
jurisdiction in intra-EU context, instead of reading into the text of the ECT something that 
is not expressly stated therein. In this regard, Art. 16 ECT clearly states that the contract-
ing parties to the ECT, including the EU, have agreed that, any prior or subsequent treaties 
that parties enter into with each other, shall not be construed so as to derogate from sub-
stantive protections or the right to dispute settlement mechanism of the ECT, where the 
ECT provision is more favourable to the investor or investment. It seems to me that there 
is no doubt that the ECT is more favourable to investors than EU law. Therefore, as a con-
 
65 According to the Commission, the Achmea judgment applies to all intra-EU investment disputes, 
including those under the ECT: see Communication COM(2018) 547, pp. 3-4. 
66 Electrabel v. Hungary, cit., para. 4.131. 
67 Ibid., para. 134. 
68 Ibid., paras 4.137 et seq. 
69 European Commission Press Release of 17 December 1994, europa.eu. 
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flict rule determining the relationship between the ECT and other international treaties, 
Art. 16 ECT makes clear that in case of a conflict between the ECT and EU law, the ECT 
should prevail because it is a more favourable agreement for investors in the EU. As such, 
it poses “an insurmountable obstacle” to the argument that EU law should prevail over the 
ECT, in particular in cases involving two “old” Member States.70 
Professor Van Gend en Loos: Investment tribunals heavily rely on allegedly “clearer con-
flict rule” over the EU conflict rule in Art. 351 TFEU,71 although Art. 16 ECT remains con-
troversial as a conflict rule. Art. 16 should rather be understood as an interpretative 
rule as it explicitly refers to “construing” rights. Instead, Art. 351 TFEU and Art. 30 VCLT 
are the relevant conflict rules to be applied in intra-EU disputes under the ECT. The only 
tribunal which correctly asserted that EU law prevails over the ECT, in view of both EU 
law and general international law, was the tribunal in Electrabel.72 Although Electrabel 
dispute involved an “old” and a “new” Member State, namely a claim by a Belgian inves-
tor against Hungary, whereby the ECT was initially concluded as an extra-EU interna-
tional treaty, the same conclusion should be reached in cases of disputes between “old” 
Member States.73 Precedence of EU primary law over the ECT in such cases is clear in 
light of a contrario interpretation of Art. 351 TFEU and Art. 30, para. 3, VCLT since the 
ECT has been overridden by all successive treaties between “old” EU Member States 
concluded after the ECT’s entry into force.74 Therefore, investment tribunals should ap-
ply the ECT in light of EU law.75 And primary EU law, as explained by the CJEU in the 
Achmea judgment, renders their jurisdiction inapplicable in intra-EU disputes. 
 
70 Vattenfall II, cit., para. 229. 
71 Ibid., para. 227. 
72 The tribunal’s analysis was, however, hypothetical as the tribunal did not find any material incon-
sistency between EU law and the ECT: Electrabel v. Hungary, cit., paras 4.166-4.167. With respect to a po-
tential conflict between EU law and ISDS mechanism, the tribunal reached the conclusion that “nothing in 
EU law can be interpreted as precluding investor-State arbitration under the ECT and the ICSID Conven-
tion” (para. 4.175). With respect to a potential conflict between EU law and substantive protections under 
the ECT, the tribunal reached the conclusion that the two do not share the same subject-matter but still, 
however, “share much in common” (paras 4.176-4.177). 
73 See the analysis in Electrabel v. Hungary, cit., paras 4.178-4.191. The tribunal thus concluded: “In 
summary, from whatever perspective the relationship between the ECT and EU law is examined, the tri-
bunal concludes that EU law would prevail over the ECT in case of any material inconsistency”. 
74 Treaty of Amsterdam (1999), Treaty of Nice (2003), Treaty of Lisbon (2009). To this effect, see also the 
Commission’s submission in Vattenfall II, cit., para. 91. In the Vattenfall II case, to support the argument of 
primacy of EU law over the ECT, the Commission has also invoked VCLT Art. 41 (modification of international 
treaties). According to this argument, by concluding subsequent EU treaties after the ratification of the ECT, 
Germany and Sweden amended the ECT in order to apply EU law in their mutual relations. 
75 Electrabel v. Hungary, cit., para. 4.130. 
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III. Achmea or how international investment tribunals do not 
understand EU law 
iii.1. Why investment tribunals do not have jurisdiction in all intra-EU 
disputes? 
Ms Icsid: The argument that the Achmea judgment applies to all intra-EU arbitrations, 
both under intra-EU BITs and the ECT is, however, unsupported in light of the text of 
this judgment and the questions asked by the referring German court. Achmea applies 
only to BITs – that is, bilateral and not multilateral treaties, and only to those BITs con-
cluded between the Member States. As we know, the ECT is not a bilateral treaty be-
tween the Member States but a multilateral treaty to which the EU is also a party.76 
Furthermore, Achmea relates only to those intra-EU BITs that contain the same 
ISDS clause as the Netherlands – Slovakia BIT that was questioned in Achmea. In partic-
ular, it is relevant that this ISDS clause explicitly defines “the law in force of the Con-
tracting Party” as the applicable law. In interpreting this ISDS provision, the CJEU drew 
the conclusion that investment tribunals “may be called on to interpret or indeed to ap-
ply EU law, particularly the provisions concerning the fundamental freedoms, including 
freedom of establishment and free movement of capital” – a competence that exclu-
sively belongs to the CJEU.77 The Court of Justice asserted squarely that only ISDS clause 
“such as” the one in the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT is incompatible with TFEU Arts 267 
and 344, and not all ISDS clauses in all intra-EU BITs.78 Therefore, the Achmea judgment 
is of limited application. 
Professor Van Gend en Loos: Such interpretation of Achmea is too narrow. You are ex-
clusively focusing on the BIT at issue in the manner of a common law lawyer who is ar-
guing their case by distinguishing it from a precedent that does not suit them. Whether 
the agreement is bilateral or multilateral, and whether the EU is party to an agreement 
or not is irrelevant for the case in point. In approaching Achmea narrowly, you fail to 
grapple with the logic of the CJEU and its legal order that the Court is called to defend 
under the Treaties. 
The Achmea judgment must be placed in the broader picture of the EU judicial sys-
tem. This is what the CJEU stressed as its main reason for declaring the ISDS clause at 
issue incompatible with EU law. The essence of the problem is that investment tribunals 
do not sit within the EU judicial system79 while domestic courts form an essential part of 
that system. The EU judicial system reckons upon the cooperation between the CJEU 
 
76 ICSID, award of 16 May 2018, case no. ARB/14/1, Masdar Solar and Wind Cooperatief U.A. v. King-
dom of Spain, paras 679-680 (emphasis added). 
77 Achmea [GC], cit., paras 40-42 (emphasis added). 
78 Ibid., para. 60. 
79 Ibid., para. 45. 
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and the domestic courts of the 28 Member States. In this system, the domestic courts 
are called on to apply EU law although they might not quash EU legal acts. They do so in 
close cooperation with the CJEU through the preliminary ruling procedure. Unlike in-
vestment tribunals, domestic courts can refer questions for a preliminary ruling in ac-
cordance with Art. 267 TFEU. This is relevant with respect to two aspects. 
Firstly, in providing a preliminary ruling mechanism, the Treaty ensures that the 
CJEU deals with all questions of interpretation and application of EU law. In so doing, 
the uniformity of EU law is guaranteed.80 The preliminary ruling procedure in Art. 267 
TFEU is the “keystone” of the EU judicial system as it establishes a dialogue between the 
CJEU and the courts and tribunals of the Member States.81 This dialogue has for its ob-
ject “securing uniform interpretation of EU law, thereby serving to ensure its consisten-
cy, its full effect and its autonomy as well as, ultimately, the particular nature of the law 
established by the Treaties”.82 Plainly speaking, every national court in the EU, faced 
with an EU legal issue, refers relevant questions regarding the interpretation of EU law 
to the CJEU, thus ensuring the consistent interpretation of EU law by the CJEU. There-
fore, the preliminary ruling procedure enhances the dialogue between the CJEU and the 
national courts with a view to achieving a uniform application of EU law across the EU.83 
Since investment tribunals cannot refer questions of EU law to the CJEU, this may lead 
to inconsistent interpretation of EU law. As a consequence, the EU legal system enhanc-
es uniformity and consistency; on the contrary, international investment law is charac-
terised by its inconsistency. After all, these inconsistencies are one of the reasons for 
the currently ongoing global ISDS reform.84 
Secondly, since investment tribunals are situated outside the EU judicial system, 
their awards cannot be subject to control by domestic courts and the CJEU for their 
compliance with EU law. In words of the CJEU, their awards cannot be subject to “mech-
anisms” of the EU judicial system which ensure “the full effectiveness of the rules of the 
EU”.85 In accordance with Art. 19, para. 1, TEU, it is for the national court and the CJEU 
“to ensure the full application of EU law in all Member States”.86 It is settled case-law 
that it is “for the national courts and tribunals and for the Court of Justice to ensure the 
full application of EU law in all Member States and to ensure judicial protection of an 
 
80 Court of Justice, judgment of 24 November 2011, case C-281/09, European Commission v. Spain, 
para. 42. 
81 Ibid., para. 37. 
82 Court of Justice, opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014, para. 176. 
83 Court of Justice, judgment of 13 May 1981, case 66/80, SpA International Chemical Corporation, 
para. 11. 
84 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Note by the Secretariat of 28 
August 2018, Possible reform of investor-State dispute settlement: Consistency and related matters, UN 
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individual’s rights under that law”.87 In doing so, domestic courts ensure that national 
law complies with EU law. However, in case of intra-EU investment awards, there is no 
such mechanism whatsoever. Consequently, awards inconsistent with EU law are valid: 
this ultimately challenges the EU legal order. 
Therefore, ISDS interference with EU law in intra-EU disputes challenges the very 
foundations of the EU legal order. This is irrespective of whether ISDS mechanism 
providing for intra-EU disputes is encapsulated in intra-EU BITs, the ECT or the ICSID ar-
bitration, and irrespective of the particular expression or formulation of ISDS mecha-
nism in these instruments. 
iii.2. The Advocate General’s Opinion is not legally binding and 
preliminary ruling only answers the questions asked 
Ms Icsid: If that was indeed the case, learned colleague, why the CJEU did not clearly say 
that its ruling also relates to intra-EU disputes under the ECT? Why the CJEU did not ad-
dress, depart from, or reject the opinion of AG Wathelet dated 19 September 2017, 
which emphasised the distinction between intra-EU BITs and the ECT?88 In particular, if 
the AG noted that the ECT was concluded “as an ordinary multilateral treaty in which all 
the Contracting Parties participate on an equal footing”, why the CJEU did not correct 
the AG’ reasoning and address the exclusion of ISDS mechanism in intra-EU disputes? 
Moreover, why the CJEU did not refute the assertion of the AG that “no EU institution 
and no Member State” sought an opinion from the Court on the compatibility between 
the ECT and the founding Treaties “because none of them had the slightest suggestion 
that it might be incompatible”?89 Instead, in Achmea the CJEU is simply silent on the is-
sue of compatibility of intra-EU ISDS under the ECT with EU law. Consequently, several 
investment tribunals have been recently asserting their jurisdiction in intra-EU disputes 
relying on the AG opinion.90 
Professor Van Gend en Loos: The CJEU answered only those questions which had been 
submitted by the domestic court. In Achmea, the German Bundesgerichtshof (Federal 
Court of Justice) expressed doubts concerning the compatibility of the Netherlands-
Slovakian BIT with Arts 267 and 344 TFEU and with the principle of non-discrimination 
set forth in Art. 18 TFEU. For these reasons, it asked the CJEU to give a preliminary ruling 
as regards these questions. It is the task of the CJEU to answer only those questions 
that the referring domestic court asked, and to the extent that is necessary for the re-
ferring court to correctly apply EU law in the main proceedings. In so doing, the CJEU 
differs from a common law court, which in its judgments not only rules on the legal is-
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sue but also provides discussions of doctrine, disquisitions of legal concepts or policy 
arguments based on considerations outside of legal discourse.91 
AGs provide independent and impartial opinions concerning the case at issue prior 
to the Court’s deliberations.92 That said, their opinions are not binding upon the Court. 
Indeed, dissenting AG’s opinions do not call into question the legal validity of the CJEU’s 
judgment. Accordingly, the investment tribunals cannot reckon upon the reasoning of 
AG Melchior Wathelet. 
Ms Icsid: However, it is clear that the Achmea judgment relies expressly on very particu-
lar aspects: 1) the place of arbitration is Frankfurt and therefore, German law applies to 
the arbitral proceedings; 2) the judicial review falls within the competence of German 
courts; 3) in the review process, the German Federal Court of Justice submitted a num-
ber of preliminary questions to the CJEU.93 None of these aspects apply in the majority 
of other intra-EU arbitrations. It is therefore, logical to conclude that in Achmea the 
CJEU merely answered the questions referred by the German Bundesgerichtshof re-
garding the validity of the clause provided for in the Netherlands – Slovakia BIT. Accord-
ingly, it is impossible to generalise anything from that judgment. 
Professor Van Gend en Loos: This is not at all the case. Of importance is to note that the 
CJEU judgments interpreting EU law enjoy an authority similar to those of national su-
preme courts in civil law countries. Accordingly, after receiving the answer from the 
CJEU to a question concerning the interpretation of EU law which it has submitted to the 
Court, or where the case-law of the CJEU already provides a clear answer to that ques-
tion, the domestic court is itself required “to do everything necessary to ensure that 
that interpretation of EU law is applied”.94 What is more, the national court must set 
aside the provisions of national law declared to be inconsistent with EU law, without 
having to request or await its prior removal by the legislature.95 
It follows that the preliminary ruling of the CJEU in Achmea is not only binding on 
the German court involved in resolving the dispute that gave rise to the preliminary rul-
ing (inter partes); the ruling is also binding erga omnes, on all other courts of all Mem-
ber States (autorité de la chose interprétée).96 In other words, preliminary rulings are 
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binding both on the referring court and on all courts in the EU.97 It follows that all other 
courts have to interpret the EU rule in question in accordance with the operative part 
and the ratio of the preliminary ruling.98 Since in Achmea the CJEU found the intra-EU 
ISDS mechanism inconsistent with EU law, no national court may reach an opposite 
conclusion. And since the CJEU did not provide any temporal limitation of the effects of 
its ruling (limitation ratione temporis), all EU Member States are bound ex tunc by the 
preliminary ruling in Achmea.99 This is different to a precedent of a common law court, 
which applies ex nunc. Therefore, the provisions under which an investor from one of 
the Member States may, in the event of a dispute concerning investments in another 
Member State, bring proceedings against the latter Member State before an arbitral tri-
bunal whose jurisdiction that Member State has undertaken to accept in an investment 
treaty, have become inapplicable throughout the EU.100 Accordingly, as the German 
Bundesgerichtshof decided that Slovakia’s offer to arbitrate was inapplicable on the 
ground that it was incompatible with EU law, and thus no effective arbitration agree-
ment could not have been concluded,101 every other national court, if confronted with 
an intra-EU investment award, should reach the same conclusion. 
iii.3. Why is commercial arbitration different from investment arbitra-
tion? 
Ms Icsid: Why the CJEU in Achmea made a distinction between investment and com-
mercial arbitration, asserting that the former is incompatible and the latter compatible 
with EU law? Commercial arbitration tribunals, in the same manner as investment tri-
 
RAEPENBUSH, Droit institutionnel de l’Union européenne, cit., p. 624; F. PICOD (dir.), Europe Traité, Vol. 3, 
Paris: Lexis Nexis, 2016, p. 19. Cf. A. TOTH, The Authority of Judgments of the European Court of Justice: 
Binding Force and Legal Effects, in Yearbook of European Law, 1984, p. 1 et seq. 
97 To this effect, see SpA International Chemical Corporation, cit., paras 12-13 and 15; Court of Jus-
tice, judgment of 5 October 2010, case C-173/09, Elchinov, para. 29; Puligienica Facility Esco SpA, cit., para. 
38. Since the CJEU prescribes to civil law tradition, its judgments are assumed to have declaratory effect 
(they do not create new law but clarify the existing rules) and have binding effect on all relationships gov-
erned by the legal instrument since it entered into force: D. CHALMERS, G. DAVIES, G. MONTI, European Union 
Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 171. 
98 SpA International Chemical Corporation, cit., para. 13; Court of Justice, judgment of 22 October 
1987, case 314/85, Foto-Frost. 
99 Court of Justice: judgment of 27 March 1980, case 61/79, Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato 
v. Denkavit, para. 16; judgment of 13 January 2004, case C-453/00, Kühne and Heitz v. Productschap voor 
Pluimvee en Eieren, para. 21. See also M. BROBERG, N. FENGER, Preliminary References to the European 
Court of Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 445. 
100 N. DE SADELEER, The End of the Game: The Autonomy of the EU Legal Order Opposes Arbitral Tri-
bunals Under Bilateral Investment Treaties Concluded Between Two Member States, in European Journal 
of Risk Regulation, 2018, p. 366. 
101 German Federal Court of Justice, judgment of 31 October 2018, I ZB 2/15, para. 25. 
I Would Rather Be a Respondent State Before a Domestic Court in the EU 41 
bunals, are not “courts or tribunals of Member States”.102 Therefore, they also cannot 
refer questions of EU law for preliminary ruling to the CJEU. In the same manner, com-
mercial arbitration in the EU may lead to awards incompatible with EU law. However, in 
spite of these risks, the validity of their awards has never been disputed by the CJEU. 
Moreover, in light of the CJEU’s reasoning in Achmea, it seems that the validity of com-
mercial arbitration under EU law has been reinforced.103 
Professor Van Gend en Loos: Although commercial tribunals cannot refer questions for 
a preliminary ruling, there are two significant differences between commercial and in-
vestment arbitration. Firstly, commercial arbitration originates in “the freely expressed 
wishes of the parties” stated in an arbitration agreement. On the contrary, investment 
arbitration originates in an international treaty between two Member States, who have 
removed from their jurisdiction intra-EU disputes although such disputes “may concern 
the application and interpretation of EU law”.104 This is in direct contradiction with the 
Member States’ obligations under EU law, in particular Art. 344 TFEU, by which Member 
States have undertaken not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or appli-
cation of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided for in the 
Treaty. In other words, under Art. 344 TFEU Member States have undertaken to submit 
their inter se disputes concerning the interpretation and application of EU law exclu-
sively to a dispute settlement mechanism within the EU judicial system. As we know by 
now, it is undisputed that investment tribunals do not form part of the EU judicial sys-
tem. Therefore, it is now also clear that Art. 344 TFEU applies not only to disputes be-
tween Member States inter se, as clarified by the Court of Justice in MOX Plant case,105 
but also to disputes between private parties and Member States when such disputes 
concern the interpretation and the application of EU law. This reasoning moves away 
from what investment tribunals have hitherto been claiming.106 
Secondly and more importantly, the review of commercial awards regarding their 
compatibility with EU law is possible in the enforcement stage. Conversely, the review of 
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investment awards depends on the applicable domestic law and the type of award. It 
must be noted that such review is fully excluded in the case of ICSID awards. When re-
viewing commercial awards, national courts can review the validity of arbitration 
agreements under the applicable law as well as the consistency of the award with public 
policy.107 Although such review is limited in its scope, it allows for examination of the 
compatibility of the commercial award with the fundamental provisions of EU law.108 In 
the course of such review, national courts can also refer questions of EU law for a pre-
liminary ruling.109 Therefore, with respect to commercial arbitration, national courts can 
review and thus control the compatibility of awards with EU law. Consequently, Mem-
ber States can ensure the full application of EU law in accordance with their obligation 
under Art. 19, para. 1, TEU. 
Ms Icsid: However, there is “no automatic reference to or seizure by the CJEU, as soon 
as any question of EU law arises before a national court”, which consequently leaves 
open “the possibility, if not the probability, of divergent interpretations or applications 
of EU law to similar disputes by courts and tribunals within the European Union”.110 It 
also seems to me that the problem with investment arbitration could have been avoid-
ed if the CJEU followed AG Wahtelet’s opinion in which he concluded that investment 
tribunals could be considered “courts or tribunals of Member States”.111 If investment 
tribunals had an avenue to refer their questions to the CJEU, the review of investment 
awards for their compatibility with EU law would not have been a problem. In light of 
the discretion given to the national courts, the mere existence of a possibility of referral 
given to investment tribunals would have been sufficient to ensure control of the com-
patibility of their awards with EU law. 
Professor Van Gend en Loos: In a case brought before a national court, whenever a 
question of interpretation which is new and of general interest for the uniform applica-
tion of EU law is raised, or where the existing case-law does not appear to give the nec-
essary guidance to deal with a new legal situation, the domestic courts should refer to 
the CJEU a question for a preliminary ruling. Although there is a certain degree of dis-
cretion given to national courts in deciding when to refer the relevant questions to the 
CJEU, there are mechanisms in EU law to ensure that national courts comply with pre-
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liminary ruling requirements. “Where there is no judicial remedy against the decision of 
a national court”, the domestic court is in principle obliged to make a reference to the 
CJEU where a question of the interpretation of the Treaty is raised before it.112 The fact 
of not referring the questions could give rise to an infringement proceeding in accord-
ance with Art. 258 TFEU113 and State liability.114 It must be emphasised that the dialogue 
between national courts and the CJEU is aimed at building mutual trust and cooperation 
between the courts in the EU, which would be difficult if the national courts’ authority to 
make preliminary reference at their own discretion was undermined. Ultimately, such 
judicial cooperation has been designed to ensure compliance with EU law, which “is of 
the essence of the rule of law”.115 
Although the CJEU found that investment tribunals are not courts or tribunals of 
Member States, they still might have an indirect recourse to the preliminary ruling pro-
cedure under Art. 267 TFEU, through the assistance of national courts.116 However, 
even with such possibility, I am not convinced that investment tribunals would recog-
nise EU law as a relevant issue in investment arbitration and thus refer questions con-
cerning the interpretation and/or validity of EU law for reference to the CJEU. The prac-
tice of arbitral tribunals clearly demonstrates that they had so far little regard for EU 
law. They have held that there is no EU rule which would prevent Member States from 
resolving their disputes with investors from other Member States by arbitration.117 On 
that basis, no investment tribunal, pre- or post-Achmea, has ever upheld the intra-EU 
jurisdictional objection.118 Moreover, investment tribunals claimed that there is no EU 
rule which would prevent arbitral tribunals from applying EU law to intra-EU dis-
putes.119 Some tribunals went as far as to deny “interpretative monopoly” of the 
CJEU.120 It is now clear that such reasoning disregards the autonomy of EU law. 
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IV. Who fragments what? 
Ms Icsid: However, arbitral tribunals were also clear that their jurisdiction only concerns 
breaches of an international investment treaty, whether an intra-EU BIT or the ECT, and 
not of EU law. Therefore, their role is not to give an “authoritative interpretation of EU 
law”121 which would be binding on Member States or the EU, but to interpret an inter-
national agreement in question.122 In this sense, EU law in investment arbitration has 
been mostly treated as a matter of international law123 or as a matter of fact.124 In cases 
where EU law has been raised as a relevant issue in intra-EU arbitration, arbitral tribu-
nals have generally attempted to interpret the obligations of Member States under the 
international treaty harmoniously with EU law, in light of the principle of systemic inte-
gration in general international law.125 Investment tribunals have not found any materi-
al inconsistency between EU law and international investment law, neither with respect 
to jurisdictional issues related to ISDS mechanism nor substantive issues related to in-
vestment protections guaranteed in investment agreements.126 It is the EU, firstly the 
Commission and then the CJEU, that sparked off a debate of unprecedented nature be-
tween EU law and investment law, and not vice versa. 
Professor Van Gend en Loos: Given the objectives of EU law as explained so far, the re-
lationship between EU law and investment law should not be understood in terms of 
conflict. Both regimes share the aim of guaranteeing investment protections, the only 
difference is in the leeway given to regulatory powers of the State under each regime. In 
any case, any limitations on economic freedoms within the EU, which might infringe in-
vestors’ rights, must be proportionate and justified by reason of public policy.127 In 
Achmea, the CJEU conclusively resolved the inconsistency between EU law and interna-
tional investment law with respect to jurisdictional issues. The CJEU did not find neces-
sary to tackle any potential substantive issues and it did not discuss whether ISDS 
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clause leads to substantive inconsistencies, such as discrimination under Art. 18 TFEU. 
Furthermore, ISDS outside the intra-EU context has not been questioned by the CJEU. 
Ms Icsid: However, it cannot be ignored that a number of intra-EU arbitrations do not 
concern issues of EU law at all but policy areas in which Member States enjoy, if not ex-
clusive competence then a wide discretion in policy making. For example, in Vattenfall II, 
the Swedish energy company Vattenfall challenged under the ECT the German decision 
to phase out nuclear energy in reaction to the 2011 Fukushima nuclear incident. Ger-
many fully exercised its policy discretion in deciding to close the nuclear plants since 
nothing in EU law obliged it to do so. And since such decision falls squarely within the 
domestic powers of Germany, the investor has no guarantees under EU law. 
Furthermore, following Achmea, international investment tribunals would not have 
jurisdiction for such intra-EU arbitration although intra-EU jurisdiction has not even 
been raised in this case prior to the Achmea judgment. Therefore, Art. 344 TFEU should 
be understood to apply only to intra-EU investment disputes which might in their merits 
stage involve a conflict between EU law and international investment law with respect 
to substantive issues. This could indeed lead to a possibility of an investment tribunal 
interpreting EU law. However, Art. 344 TFEU should not be applicable to preclude the 
jurisdiction of investment tribunals in all intra-EU cases, and in particular not in those 
cases which do not involve the possibility of divergent interpretation of investors’ sub-
stantive protections under EU law.128 
Professor Van Gend en Loos: EU law is the relevant law for the interpretation of the inter-
national investment agreement involving two EU Member States as a matter of interna-
tional law. By virtue of Art. 31, para. 3, let. c), VCLT, any investment tribunal would need to 
apply the Achmea judgment as a “relevant rule of international law applicable in the rela-
tions between the parties” when interpreting all clauses of an intra-EU BIT, including its 
ISDS clause. As a matter of fact, determining the jurisdiction of investment tribunals is the 
first step in any investment arbitration and, naturally, this step precedes the merits stage 
of the dispute. The tribunal would thus find that EU law applies directly to its jurisdiction 
in accordance with the BIT at issue, thereby declaring the ISDS clause inapplicable. In the 
same manner, when interpreting the ISDS clause in Art. 26 ECT in a dispute involving an 
investor from one Member State against another Member State, the investment tribunal 
should take into account the Achmea judgment and accordingly decline its jurisdiction. 
Achmea applies as a relevant rule of international law to all intra-EU situations, regardless 
of whether they involve any other substantive issues of EU law relevant for the merits of 
the claim. In the absence of investment tribunals’ jurisdiction, these issues become irrele-
vant. In all intra-EU investment cases, even those that fall squarely within domestic pow-
ers of a Member State, investors’ rights are guaranteed under EU law since Member 
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States’ domestic legal orders in all cases must comply with fundamental principles and 
rights guaranteed in the founding Treaties and the EU Charter. 
Ms Icsid: Such an approach is jeopardising the consistency of international investment 
law and contradicts the principle of relative effect of treaties enshrined in Art. 30 VCLT. 
It is particularly problematic in the multilateral context of the ECT. On the one hand, the 
ECT ISDS clause should not be applicable in intra-EU disputes. On the other hand, the 
same clause should continue to apply between third non-EU States and in extra-EU con-
text between EU Member States and third States. If tribunals take Achmea as the rele-
vant rule of international law applicable in intra-EU relations for the interpretation of 
the ECT, and do not apply the same rule in extra-EU relations, this would result in the 
fragmentation of the ECT.129 Consequently, we would end up with a dual regime under 
the same agreement, one favouring respondent States in the intra-EU context, the oth-
er favouring investors litigating against host States in the extra-EU and non-EU context. 
This would indeed undermine the multilateralism to which the EU so much aspires.130 
Professor Van Gend en Loos: It is undisputable that international investment law is one 
of the most fragmented areas of international law, much worse than environmental law 
or fundamental rights law, to say the least. The profusion of investment agreements 
with 2,361 different treaties currently in force, is indeed astonishing.131 The mere fact 
that the ECT provides for a specific regime, albeit a multilateral one, compounds the 
fragmentation of international law. Different ad hoc investment tribunals adjudicate in-
vestment claims according to the provisions of the specific investment treaty establish-
ing these tribunals, whether a BIT or the ECT. Furthermore, there is no central authority 
harmonising their jurisprudence. Specific differences between treaties are often used 
as a justification for departing from earlier practice. Even appreciations of the Achmea 
judgment differ between different tribunals guided by the same procedural rules.132 On 
the other hand, and unlike investment law which reckons to a great extent upon a bilat-
eral approach, the EU favours a multilateral approach and a jus commune that applies 
to its 28 Member States. The CJEU is the sole court to rule on all EU legal matters and it 
is doing its very best to streamline its case-law for the sake of consistency. The case-law 
on the freedom of establishment is a case in point. All guiding principles have been set-
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tled in the Seventies.133 Domestic courts feel comfortable in adjudicating disputes in 
light of the CJEU’s settled case-law. 
Ms Icsid: However, if the EU founding Treaties have created a “municipal legal order of 
trans-national dimensions”,134 whereby the founding Treaties are its “basic constitu-
tional charter”,135 any Member States’ duties under EU law should rather be understood 
as domestic law obligations, which cannot serve as justification for the Member States’ 
failure to perform an international treaty obligation.136 After all, pacta sunt servanda!137 
In addition, in the context of the ECT, the EU and its Member States did not include 
an explicit disconnection clause, which would have ensured that EU law governs rela-
tions between Member States inter se to the extent that a subject matter is covered by 
EU law, while the ECT governs the obligations between EU Member States and non-EU 
ECT parties.138 Such clause would have ensured that Member States’ obligations under 
the ECT do not hamper the implementation of EU law, while preserving legal certainty 
towards third parties. As the tribunal in Eiser well noted, the “ECT’s ordinary meaning” 
cannot be disregarded “in order to exclude a potentially significant body of claims”.139 
After all, “[i]t is a fundamental rule of international law that treaties are to be interpret-
ed in good faith. As a corollary, treaty makers should be understood to carry out their 
function in good faith, and not to lay traps for the unwary with hidden meanings and 
sweeping implied exclusions”.140 
iv.1. The peculiar case of the ECT again: fragmentation or integration? 
Professor Van Gend en Loos: In the context of the ECT, the character of the EU as a re-
gional economic integration organisation (REIO) cannot be ignored, including the fact 
that energy integration in the EU single market has been work in progress since the be-
ginning of the ECT, ultimately serving the interests of investors.141 A disconnection 
clause can be implied in the text of the ECT in the context of these developments. In 
particular, an investment by an investor from one EU Member State in the area of an-
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134 See opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, Kadi, cit., para. 21. 
135 Court of Justice, judgment of 23 April 1986, case 294/83, Les Verts, para. 23. 
136 Art. 27 VCLT. 
137 See the comment of the tribunal in RREEF v. Spain, cit., para. 85. 
138 See International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law, cit., paras 289-294. 
139 Eiser v. Spain, cit., para. 186. According to UNCTAD database, of 119 ECT cases, 76 are intra-EU in-
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other EU Member State is made within the “area” of the EU as a REIO, which is the area 
belonging to the same contracting party even when it involves two different EU Member 
States.142 Consequently, the EU’s offer to arbitrate in the Art. 26 ECT is only made to in-
vestors from non-EU Member States, thus eliminating the EU Member States’ individual 
standing as respondents under the ECT.143 From the very beginning, the EU was clear 
that the ultimate power to issue rulings on EU law in intra-EU ISDS procedures under 
the ECT should remain with the CJEU.144 
Ms Icsid: Legal certainty requires that any relevant rule of international law, that is to be 
taken into account for interpretation, must be clear.145 If it was intended that the offer to 
arbitrate in Art. 26 ECT was only made to investors from non-EU Member States, it would 
have been necessary to include such an arrangement in an explicit language in the ECT.146 
After all, the ECT is “the constitution” of the ECT tribunals and they therefore, must ensure 
“the full application” of that agreement.147 Their jurisdiction is derived from the express 
terms of the ECT. Investment tribunals are not institutions of the EU legal order, as the 
CJEU confirmed in its Achmea judgment. Therefore, they are not subject to the require-
ments of that legal order.148 The EU has only indicated in its Statement to the ECT Secre-
tariat that the CJEU is “competent to examine” any question relating to the application and 
interpretation of international agreements concluded by the EU (e.g. the ECT).149 This 
does not include the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU to interpret the ECT.150 
Professor Van Gend en Loos: The ECT, as an international agreement to which the EU is a 
party, is part of the EU legal order. In this sense, the CJEU has an exclusive competence to 
interpret the ECT as a matter of EU law, either when examining the compliance of an EU 
act with EU law or on the basis of a request for a preliminary ruling under Art. 267 TFEU. 
This was the reason why the consent to the submission of a dispute to international arbi-
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tration in cases of disputes involving the “application of the forms of action provided by 
the constituent Treaties of the Communities” was not given unconditionally.151 
Ms Icsid: If it was intended that intra-EU arbitration would not be available to investors, 
such an intention should have been made explicit through a disconnection clause in the 
ECT or through the adoption of a supplementary instrument.152 Moreover, as correctly 
noted by the Vattenfall II tribunal, the travaux préparatoires of the ECT reveal that dur-
ing the negotiation of the ECT, the EU had proposed the insertion of a disconnection 
clause, which was however ultimately dropped from the draft treaty. In light of that, the 
tribunal “could only conclude that a disconnection clause was intentionally omitted 
from the ECT”.153 The absence of such a clause can indeed indicate that the ECT was in-
tended to create obligations between Member States of the EU, including in respect of 
ISDS,154 and not vice versa. Equally, investment tribunals cannot extrapolate from Ach-
mea a new rule of international law, which would render an ISDS clause in the ECT intra-
EU relations inapplicable if this is not clearly stated in that judgment.155 And in any case, 
as already explained, Art. 16 ECT prohibits the terms of another agreement to be con-
strued as to derogate from the investor’s right to ISDS under the ECT.156 
In light of all these circumstances, the only way for the EU and its Member States to 
resolve this uncertainty is to amend the ECT with the effect of excluding arbitration in 
intra-EU disputes and replacing it by EU law and its dispute settlement.157 To the best of 
my knowledge, there have been no such attempts on the EU side so far. 
 
151 Statement submitted by the European Communities to the Secretariat of the Energy Charter pur-
suant to Art. 26(3)(b)(ii) of the ECT (1998), para. 5. 
152 Vattenfall II, cit., para. 202. For example, potential conflicts between the ECT and the Svalbard 
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ergy Charter Conference, Annex 2. 
153 Vattenfall II, cit., para. 206. 
154 Ibid., paras 205-206. 
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156 See discussion supra, section II.3. 
157 A disconnection clause would have limited effect if extra-EU ISDS disputes are also not properly 
addressed: see RREEF v. Spain, cit., paras 51-52; A. DELGADO CASTELEIRO, Disconnecting from the Energy 
Charter Treaty: Disconnection Clauses and Normative Conflicts Between European Union Law and the 
Energy Charter, in A. DIMOPOULOS (ed.), The EU and Investment Arbitration Under the Energy Charter Trea-
ty, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming, pp. 18-22. An amendment to the ECT would re-
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with other non-EU Contracting Parties, which might be difficult if the asymmetrical effects of the autono-
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fra, section IV.2). A reservation in the context of Art. 46 ECT, which precludes reservations running contra-
ry to the intent of the Contracting Parties to have the ECT unconditionally and integrally applied by all 
Parties, would also be problematic. 
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Professor Van Gend en Loos: Undoubtedly, in its intra-EU aspect, ISDS provision of the 
ECT must be brought in line with EU law, excluding intra-EU arbitration. Given that the 
ECT is part of the EU legal order, it should be brought to conformity with primary law 
also for the purpose of legal certainty. In the meantime, it is likely that the CJEU will 
soon have an opportunity to rule on the compatibility of the intra-EU disputes under 
the ECT with EU law, which should then conclusively resolve the controversy of Ach-
mea’s applicability in the ECT context.158 And it is more than likely that such judgment 
will be in line with the CJEU’s reasoning in Achmea rendering intra-EU arbitration under 
the ECT inapplicable. With respect to the future of the ECT, it is likely that Achmea does 
not mark the end of the ECT for the EU and its Member States, despite Italy’s withdraw-
al, but an end of its hybrid intra and extra-EU character and thus a continuation of the 
EU’s new ECT chapter which focuses on a broader global strategy.159 
iv.2. Why is intra-EU context different to extra-EU? 
Ms Icsid: The Commission has interpreted Achmea as applying to intra-EU context on-
ly.160 However, although Achmea concerned an investment treaty concluded between 
two Member States, the implications of this judgment could reach far beyond internal 
EU agreements. Many commentators believe that, in light of Achmea, the issue of extra-
EU BITs remains unclear.161 Reasoning by analogy, EU law forms part of the Member 
States’ domestic legal order and potential conflicts with EU law cannot be avoided. Giv-
en the level of abstraction applied by the CJEU, whereby the Court assessed as a threat 
to the autonomy of EU law all intra-EU disputes, even when they do not deal with issues 
of EU law, it is difficult to see how investment arbitration under extra-EU BITs would not 
give rise to the same abstract concerns regarding the interpretation of EU law. In fact, 
the ISDS mechanism in BITs concluded between Member States and third countries 
could also violate Arts 267 and 344 TFEU where the arbitral jurisdiction concerns either 
the application or the interpretation of EU law. If under an extra-EU BIT or the ECT, an 
investor from a non-EU State challenges a measure which a Member State adopted to 
comply with its EU obligations, in such a case the investment tribunal established under 
that treaty could also interpret EU law, challenging its autonomy. Would the CJEU then 
also rule that in all such cases the jurisdiction of investment tribunals should be exclud-
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ed? In particular, what if such a BIT expressly stated that the tribunal should, inter alia, 
decide the case on the basis of domestic law? 
Professor Van Gend en Loos: Indeed, if one reads Achmea broadly, potentially any dis-
pute settlement mechanism outside the EU judicial system might involve the interpreta-
tion or application of EU law.162 However, Achmea could be also read as applying only 
to those cases which not only violate Arts 267 and 344 TFEU but also undermine the 
principles of mutual trust and sincere cooperation, enshrined in Art. 19, para. 1, and Art. 
4, para. 3, TEU respectively. Indeed, these principles could be understood as the core 
elements of the Achmea judgment,163 which play an important role in the intra-EU con-
text but are not relevant for extra-EU relations. 
The principle of mutual trust between Member States mandates that Member 
States “provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields cov-
ered by Union law” and by doing so recognise in their domestic legal systems “common 
values on which the EU is founded, as stated in Art. 2 TEU” and thus ensure that the law 
of the EU that implements these common values will be respected in their territories.164 
Although this principle plays an important role in the Area of Freedom, Security and Jus-
tice, its contribution expands beyond that, to the extent that it has become a structural 
principle of EU law.165 In relation to mutual trust, the principle of sincere cooperation 
requires the Member States to “assist each other” in fulfilling their obligations under EU 
law in “full mutual respect”. In particular, they are called on to take “any appropriate 
measures” to ensure the correct implementation of EU law or to refrain from “any 
measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives”.166 
Intra-EU arbitration, which fragments the internal market, must be understood in 
this context. In other words, it is logical that inter se international agreements of EU 
Member States are subject to the requirements of primacy and effectiveness in the 
same manner as domestic laws.167 EU Member States could not be permitted to diverge 
from internal market rules by an international treaty any more than they could by do-
mestic legislation. 
Ms Icsid: Indeed, an interpretation of Achmea that would render ISDS illegal in all extra-
EU BITs could lead to problems in the relations between the Member States and third 
countries. Member States still have 1138 extra-EU treaties in force.168 The prohibition of 
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ISDS clauses in these extra-EU BITs could compound asymmetry with third countries. In 
other words, EU investors could be protected in third countries, but third country inves-
tors would not receive similar protection in the EU in any case involving an EU measure 
that is being implemented in national law. By way of illustration, a Belgian investor in 
China could initiate proceedings against the host State before an ISDS, given that EU law 
is inapplicable. However, a Chinese investor in Belgium would be unable to avail itself of 
the same right on the grounds that the tribunal could interpret and apply EU law.169 
Professor Van Gend en Loos: ISDS provision of the ECT as well as similar provisions in 
extra-EU BITs can remain applicable under Art. 351 TFEU as long as they do not conflict 
with EU law, with the exclusion of cases which concern EU measures or national 
measures implementing EU law. An investment tribunal could always argue that ISDS 
cannot be excluded on the ground that the case does not concern either the application 
or the interpretation of EU law as the subject-matter has not been harmonised. Consid-
ering the sheer breath of EU harmonisation in the energy, transport, industrial, agricul-
tural, trade in goods and in services and financial services sectors, this would be a mere 
theoretical hypothesis. However, the situation with these external agreements is per-
haps less critical as their ability to undermine the principles of mutual trust and sincere 
cooperation, and thus the autonomy of the EU legal order, is less imminent. 
Finally, considering the changes that have been made to Art. 207 TFEU, these extra-
EU BITs will eventually disappear as the EU concludes new investment treaties with 
third countries.170 Currently, the EU is negotiating investment agreements with India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, China and Myanmar. Indeed, once concluded, these 
bilateral treaties will prevail over the former extra-EU BITs.  
V. Why autonomy matters? 
Ms Icsid: Whether we talk about international agreements in general, or investment 
agreements in particular – bilateral, multilateral, intra-EU, extra-EU, those to which the 
EU is a party or Member States are parties – we always return to the issue of autonomy 
of EU law. Autonomy seems to be a leitmotif of the EU’s relationship with international 
investment law. But why should autonomy of EU law matter to anyone but the EU itself? 
Professor Van Gend en Loos: Autonomy matters for several reasons and its importance 
is not limited exclusively to the EU. Autonomy is important in defining the relationship 
between EU law and international law. In the context of international investment law, it 
is not only relevant for the normative relationship between international law and EU 
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law but also for defining the relationship between the CJEU and other international 
courts. Secondly, autonomy matters for the Member States as it ensures the attainment 
of the Union’s objectives, which ultimately serve the interests of Member States and all 
their subjects. Finally, autonomy of EU law matters for investors too, for practical rea-
sons of enforcement of investment awards. 
v.1 It matters for EU relationship with international courts 
Ms Icsid: Potentially any dispute settlement mechanism placed outside the EU judicial 
system could involve the interpretation or application of EU law. In light of the CJEU’s 
concerns for the autonomy of EU law, as expressed in Achmea, could the proposed In-
vestor Court System (ICS) in Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) 
and, similarly, a future multilateral investment court, in the same manner as ISDS, be 
problematic for the autonomy of the EU legal order? 
Professor Van Gend en Loos: The conclusion of several agreements setting up adjudicat-
ing bodies sitting outside the institutional and judicial framework of the EU, with jurisdic-
tion in respect of EU law (e.g. EU patents) raised the issue of preserving the autonomy of 
the EU legal order and court system. The CJEU’s case-law offers guidelines with respect to 
the compatibility of a new court with EU law. Importantly, the Court has declared that an 
international agreement may affect its own powers provided that the indispensable con-
ditions for safeguarding the essential character of those powers are satisfied and, conse-
quently, there is no adverse effect on the autonomy of the EU legal order.171 These 
agreements were designed, in essence, to resolve disputes on the interpretation or appli-
cation of the actual provisions of the international agreements concerned. 
In accepting the compatibility of external courts with the EU legal order, the CJEU 
endorses a three-pronged approach. In so doing, the Court strikes a balance between 
“the international derivation and the specificity of EU law”.172 
Firstly, the external court can interpret and apply exclusively the provisions of the 
agreement at issue. It follows that the autonomy of the EU would be compromised 
when the international court which has jurisdiction in relation to the interpretation and 
application of the agreement, may be called upon to interpret EU law.173 
Secondly, as a result of the first premise, the external court should not be conferred 
the competence to interpret authoritatively one way or another EU law. For instance, 
the autonomy will be affected when the envisioned court is likely to deprive the domes-
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tic courts of the power to request preliminary rulings from the CJEU in the field covered 
by the agreement.174 
Thirdly, the agreement cannot affect the jurisdiction of the CJEU to adjudicate dis-
putes between Member States in accordance with Art. 344 TFEU. 
In case one of these conditions is not fulfilled, the EU cannot conclude an agree-
ment allowing the EU to be a party to an external court, even though the founding Trea-
ties allow, or even oblige, as in the case of the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), the conclusion of such an agree-
ment.175 Against this background, the CJEU held that several draft agreements were lia-
ble to upset the underlying balance of the EU and undermine the autonomy of EU 
law.176 Of course, one could criticize the Court for adopting “an absolute and maximalist 
vision of the impenetrability of EU and international law”.177 
However, “[i]t is for the Court to ensure respect for the autonomy of the EU legal 
order thus created by the Treaties”178 and the CJEU will ultimately assess the compatibil-
ity of the new investment dispute settlement mechanism in light of all these criteria.179 
v.2. It matters for EU integration 
Ms Icsid: The CJEU has played a pivotal role in carving out the autonomy of EU. In as-
serting that EU law is autonomous from international law, the CJEU insulates this legal 
order from international law. However, all this is causing great difficulties for EU Mem-
ber States. The EU requires from its Member States to dishonour their international law 
obligations in order to comply with their EU legal obligations. Needless to say, the Kadi 
and Al Barakaat judgment180 highlights the extent to which EU law trumps international 
law. The CJEU’s vision of human rights standards with respect to restrictive measures 
imposed upon terrorists prevails over the obligations placed on the 28 Member States 
under UN law. However, there is no customary international law rule that favours EU 
integration over international law. 
Professor Van Gend en Loos: That said, I could also claim that other legal orders trump 
EU law. For instance, Belgium was condemned by the European Court of Human Rights 
for breaching Art. 3 ECHR on the grounds that asylum seekers were sent back to Greece 
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whilst that country did not correctly implement the Dublin II Regulation.181 In so doing, 
the European Court of Human Rights indirectly reviewed the legality of an EU act in light 
of the ECHR. 
Undoubtedly, the sui generis nature of EU legal order upsets international lawyers, 
including international investment arbitrators. However, without tools that defend the 
autonomy of the EU legal order, the EU project would be seriously hampered. The EU in 
21st century touches upon a wide number of issues of international importance, where-
by EU rules overlap with international standards. The main objective of the autonomy 
of EU law is not to depart from international standards (and indeed in many cases, EU 
standards are more comprehensive than international ones), but to ensure that these 
standards do not impede the implementation of EU law and thus ultimately hinder the 
EU integration. The attainment of the EU objectives requires that the rules of EU law are 
“fully applicable at the same time and with identical effects over the whole territory of 
the Community without the Member States being able to place any obstacles in the 
way”.182 Intra-EU arbitration could clearly be considered such an obstacle. As clarified by 
AG Bot, “by means of a bilateral investment agreement, two Member States had agreed 
to remove EU law from the jurisdiction of their own courts, and therefore from the judi-
cial dialogue between those courts and tribunals and the [CJEU], which was capable of 
having an adverse effect on the uniformity and effectiveness of EU law”.183 Differentia-
tion between the Member States due to international law mechanisms may indeed be a 
factor in the disintegration of the EU.184 After all, it’s all about EU integration! 
Ms Icsid: I still do not see how the achievement of such an abstract goal should in any 
way matter to foreign investors in the EU. Investors are interested in obtaining full pro-
tection of their rights, and not in achieving the political goals of the EU integration. 
v.3. It matters for practical reasons of enforcement 
Professor Van Gend en Loos: The autonomy of EU law should greatly matter to investors. 
The consequences could be serious given that the domestic courts in the EU will not be 
able to enforce the awards. Indeed, in case of a conflict between EU law and the BIT, the 
ECT or the ICSID Convention, the national courts are called on to disapply the latter. Ac-
cordingly, investment tribunals should act responsibly towards investors and decline ju-
risdiction for intra-EU disputes knowing that their awards cannot be enforced in the EU. 
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Ms Icsid: Investment tribunals are “mindful of the duty to render an enforceable deci-
sion and ultimately an enforceable award” but they are “equally conscious” of their duty 
to perform their mandate granted under the particular investment agreement.185 In-
vestment tribunals’ jurisdiction concerns the breaches of that particular treaty and the 
responsibility of States towards investors under international law. They are “not con-
cerned” with breaches of EU law stemming from Member States’ participation in intra-
EU arbitrations.186 Surely, ICSID awards, which are not subject to domestic judicial re-
view can be enforced, even in the EU.187 In any case, if not in the EU, all awards can be 
enforced outside the EU. 
Professor Van Gend en Loos: All awards can still be challenged in the execution phase, 
even ICSID awards. While the ICSID Convention indeed states that any award of an 
ICSID tribunal shall be binding and will not be subject to any domestic remedy, the Con-
vention also provides that the execution of any such award “shall be governed by the 
laws concerning the execution of judgments in force in the State in whose territories 
such execution is sought”.188 It should not be forgotten that the EU is not a party to the 
ICSID Convention, although almost all of its Member States are. Therefore, the ICSID 
Convention is not part of the EU legal order and does not prevail over EU law in domes-
tic legal orders of the Member States. Accordingly, the Member State national court is 
obliged to refuse the execution of an intra-EU ICSID award, regardless of the Member 
State’s membership to the ICSID Convention. Such awards could therefore only be en-
forced in non-EU States, subject to the availability of respondent EU Member State’s as-
sets that could be seized in the third State in which the enforcement has been sought. 
In addition, payment of compensation in certain cases could also amount to an illegal 
State aid.189 Therefore, the autonomy of EU law matters for intra-EU investors more 
than their investment lawyers wish to admit. 
VI. Conclusions 
Ms Icsid: Based on our discussion, we could agree that international investment law and 
EU law share similar grounds in international law but address the protection of foreign 
investors “from different perspectives”.190 The main philosophy of international invest-
ment law is unconditionally focused on protection of foreign investors. On the other 
hand, the highest value of the EU legal order is the integration of its internal market, to 
which all other goals must conform. With this in view, it therefore does not surprise that 
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the legal reasoning and the methods of interpretation of the CJEU and investment tri-
bunals differ to a significant degree. 
The CJEU interprets international law with an aim to ensure “systemic coherence” 
between primary sources of EU law, which form part of international law, and other 
sources of international law, in this case international investment agreements. The ar-
gument of coherence ultimately serves to achieve stronger integration within the EU. 
On the contrary, investment tribunals, while recognising that EU law is international 
law, have reduced its relevance as international law by refusing to recognise it as a rele-
vant law in the interpretation of investment agreements. Consequently, intra-EU distinc-
tion in their view cannot be allowed, as it would lead to the fragmentation, at least in 
the ECT context.191 
Ultimately, our discussion reveals the clash between the CJEU’s broader teleological 
and systemic approach in legal reasoning and arbitral tribunals’ narrower literal and 
textual focus in the interpretation of investment agreements, which leaves them frozen 
in time in which they were adopted. It seems to me that this conflict can only be re-
solved if the EU and its Member States amend the investment agreements to exclude 
intra-EU arbitration in all cases. Ultimately, this will ensure greater legal certainty for all 
investors in the EU. 
Professor Van Gend en Loos: However, the solution to intra-EU clash of the EU legal order 
and international investment law should come soon, or we would at least hope, rather 
soon. On 15 January 2019, the majority of the Member States adopted a declaration by 
which they “inform the investor community that no new intra-EU investment arbitration 
proceeding should be initiated”.192 While this is a non-legally binding declaration, it does 
send a political message to investors since States, as parties to intra-EU investment 
agreements, declare not to be bound by their mutually expressed obligations. Member 
States also announced that they would terminate their BITs by a plurilateral treaty, or 
where more expedient, bilaterally, no later than 6 December 2019.193 Such treaty should 
also address the issue of the sunset clauses. It can be expected that a solution for the in-
tra-EU application of the ECT will be a more complex task.194 The fact that some Member 
States have not signed this declaration politically complicates the matter further.195 Nev-
 
191 Vattenfall II, cit., para. 158. 
192 Declaration of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of 15 January 2019 
on the legal consequences of the judgment of the Court of Justice in Achmea and on investment protec-
tion in the European Union, para. 3. 
193 Ibid., paras 5 and 8. 
194 To that effect, see ibid., para. 9. 
195 Sweden, Luxembourg, Malta, Hungary, Finland and Slovenia have not signed the declaration. 
While these Member States agree on the issue of intra-EU BITs, they disagree on the issue of the applica-
bility of the Achmea judgment to intra-EU arbitration under the ECT. Five Member States issued a sepa-
rate declaration on 16 January (www.regeringen.se) expressing the view that it would be "inappropriate" 
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ertheless, legally speaking, in light of the Achmea judgment, all pending intra-EU arbitra-
tions should be terminated, regardless of the international instrument – intra-EU BITs or 
the ECT – under which a particular claim has been brought. Achmea sends a clear mes-
sage that ISDS clauses in international investment agreements that contravene TFEU Arts 
267 and 344 and the principles of mutual trust and sincere cooperation enshrined in TEU 
Art. 19, para.1, and Art. 4, para. 3, are invalid under EU law. 
Given the importance of the autonomy of the EU legal order, there is nothing sur-
prising or political about the Achmea judgment. Indeed, Achmea follows the line of the 
Court’s reasoning on the autonomy of EU law expressed in the Court’s earlier judg-
ments, including the opinion 2/13 in which the CJEU opposed the EU’s accession to the 
ECHR,196 and opinion 1/09197 in which the CJEU opposed the creation of an unified pa-
tent court in the framework of the European Patent Convention. The Court ultimately 
underscored that the ISDS mechanism in intra-EU BITs calls into question the principle 
of mutual trust between Member States and is thus incompatible with the principle of 
sincere cooperation, which obliges the Member States to ensure full effectiveness of EU 
law in their respective territories by taking appropriate measures which will ensure ful-
filment of their obligations under EU law.198 
Achmea reinforces the importance of the autonomy of EU law as a matter of sover-
eignty, enshrined in the ability of States to assess the compliance of the awards with 
public policy. In the EU context, the inability of the CJEU to control the compliance of in-
vestment awards with EU law through judicial review undermines the authority of the 
CJEU and, ultimately, questions the autonomy of EU law. 
Finally, Achmea confirms the crucial role of the concept of autonomy in defining the 
relationship between EU law and international law. To quote AG Maduro in Kadi: “Rela-
tionship between international law and the Community legal order is governed by the 
Community itself, and international law can permeate that legal order only under the 
conditions set by the constitutional principles of the Community”.199 
Ms Icsid: On the one hand, the EU wishes to eliminate ISDS in intra-EU disputes in order to 
ensure the attainment of the Union’s objectives and protect its legal order. On the other 
hand, the EU still does not want to completely give up on alternative investment dispute 
settlement, whether in the form of ISDS in the existing extra-EU BITs or a multilateral in-
vestment court in future perspective, as it wishes to afford protection of EU Member 
States’ outward investments in non-EU States. In other words, the EU wants to have its 
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cake and eat it. However, the CJEU’s judgment in Achmea undoubtedly demonstrates that 
in the issues of investment, EU’s internal legal homogeneity has preceded Member States’ 
political heterogeneity. More broadly, this is clearly a welcome development for a strong-
er EU’s global outreach. However, what is the future for foreign investors in Europe? 
Professor Van Gend en Loos: One should not be unnecessary dramatic. Investors are 
afforded substantive protection under both primary and secondary EU law given that 
the EU legal system provides for a complete system of remedies.200 Accordingly, they 
can invoke these provisions before the courts of the host Member State. The domestic 
court is in principle obliged to make a reference to the CJEU where a question of the in-
terpretation of the Treaty is raised before it.201 The fact of not referring the questions 
could give rise to an infringement proceeding in accordance with Art. 258 TFEU202 and 
State liability.203 EU law presumes that all national courts meet the same standards of 
justice, be it a court in Germany, Ireland, Belgium, Poland or Croatia. The principle of 
mutual trust implies that there is no second-class justice in the EU and that investors 
can expect the same level of protection before the courts of any Member State. As a 
matter of course, this is a topic for another debate. 
Ms Icsid: To quote greater international law experts than me: “The ICJ, human rights 
bodies, a trade regime or a regional exception may each be used for good or ignoble 
purposes and it should be a matter of debate and evidence and not of abstract ‘con-
sistency’, as to which institutions should be preferred in a particular situation”.204 
Last but not least, consider, much learned Professor, our investor again. S/he finds 
new opportunities in another Member State. However, without the possibility to bring 
its claim to an investment tribunal, our investor might not invest. Without that invest-
ment, the host State will not be able to obtain revenues from that project. Without 
these revenues, the development will not take place in the host State. Less developed 
Member States will continue to struggle to reach the level of development of their more 
developed counterparts. As a result, it will take much longer to overcome the challenge 
of a multi-speed Europe. To overcome such challenge, our Member State might look for 
more willing third State investors, perhaps from China. Additionally, the lack of BIT pro-
tection for their intra-EU investments could prompt some investors to consider restruc-
 
200 With respect to foreign direct investment, the fundamental freedoms of the internal market that 
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turing their investments through a holding company outside of the EU in order to bene-
fit from extra-EU BIT protections. Imagine what kind of impact could such possible fo-
rum shopping have on the legitimacy of investment treaty arbitration, which is at the 
core of ISDS criticism? Indeed, all this is a topic for another debate. 
Nevertheless, having said all that, at any given time, I would rather be an investor 
claimant before an international investment tribunal than before a domestic court of 
any of the Member States! 
 
 
 
The graph depicts the debate between the two protagonists. It displays the inter-
ference of international investment law, and in particular the intra-EU BITs, with the EU 
legal order. It highlights the difference between the domestic courts called on to pro-
vide the remedies for effective legal protection in the fields covered by EU law and the 
investment tribunals which are precluded from providing such remedies. In brief, the 
graph explains how and why investment tribunals sit outside the EU legal order. 
